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 I 
Abstract 
We studied the processing of socially relevant visual stimuli during continuous flash 
suppression (CFS), a potent interocular suppression technique that we used to render stimuli 
invisible. In Studies 1–6, we measured the duration of perceptual suppression during CFS to 
test whether socially relevant stimuli have privileged access to visual awareness. Study 1 
demonstrated that face detection in adult observers is modulated by facial properties 
previously shown to modulate looking preferences in newborns. Study 2 revealed own-race 
and own-age biases in face detection, indicating that visual awareness of faces is shaped by 
visual experience with one’s own social group. In Study 3, we found larger effects of stimulus 
inversion on the detection of human faces and bodies than for other familiar objects, 
suggesting that detection mechanisms are preferentially tuned to conspecifics. Study 4 
showed that faces with direct gaze are detected more quickly than faces with averted gaze. 
Study 5 revealed a confounding factor in schematic emotional faces that are considered to be 
well-controlled visual stimuli. In Study 6, we found that faster detection of fearful compared 
to neutral faces relies on high spatial frequencies, arguing against a functional role of a 
subcortical pathway to the amygdala. Study 7 showed that measures of visual detection 
during CFS cannot provide unequivocal evidence for unconscious processing under CFS. In 
Studies 8 and 9 we therefore measured adaptation aftereffects from stimuli rendered 
permanently invisible by CFS. In Study 8, we measured face shape aftereffects and found that 
only low-level monocular components of face shape adaptation can proceed unconsciously, 
whereas higher-level components depend on visual awareness. Study 9 revealed that only 
size-dependent low-level components of eye gaze can be represented unconsciously, while 
object-centered higher-level representations of eye gaze directions require visual awareness. 
 
Keywords: Visual awareness, interocular suppression, faces, bodies, eye gaze, facial 
expressions 
 II 
Zusammenfassung 
Wir untersuchten die Verarbeitung sozial relevanter visueller Reize während “continuous 
flash suppression” (CFS), einer besonders wirkungsvollen Technik der interokularen 
Unterdrückung, die benutzt wird um Reize unsichtbar zu machen. In den Studien 1–6 maßen 
wir die Dauer der perzeptuellen Unterdrückung während CFS um zu testen, ob sozial 
relevante Reize bevorzugten Zugang zum visuellen Bewusstsein haben. Studie 1 zeigte, dass 
die Detektion von Gesichtern bei Erwachsenen durch Gesichtsmerkmale beeinflusst wird, 
welche auch Blickpräferenzen von Neugeborenen beeinflussen. Studie 2 zeigte, dass 
Gesichtsdetektion durch die Ethnie und Altersgruppe des zu detektierenden Gesichtes 
beeinflusst wird. In Studie 3 fanden wir größere Effekte der Inversion auf die Detektion von 
menschlichen Gesichtern und Körpern als auf andere vertraute Objekte. In Studie 4 fanden 
wir, dass Gesichter mit direktem Blick schneller detektiert werden als Gesichter mit 
abgewandtem Blick. Studie 5 deckte einen konfundieren Faktor in schematischen 
emotionalen Gesichtern auf. In Studie 6 fanden wir, dass die schnellere Detektion von 
furchtsamen im Vergleich zu neutralen Gesichtern auf hohen Raumfrequenzen beruht. Studie 
7 zeigte, dass die Messung der visuellen Detektion während CFS keinen eindeutigen 
Nachweis für unbewusste Verarbeitung unter CFS erbringen kann. In den Studien 8 und 9 
maßen wir deshalb Adaptations-Nacheffekte von Reizen, die durch CFS dauerhaft unsichtbar 
gemacht wurden. Studie 8 zeigte, dass lediglich monokulare Komponenten der Gesichtsform-
Adaptation unbewusst ablaufen können, während  komplexere Komponenten auf visuelles 
Bewusstsein angewiesen sind. Studie 9 zeigte, dass nur größenabhängige Komponenten von 
Blickrichtungen unbewusst repräsentiert werden können, während objektzentrierte 
Repräsentationen von Blickrichtungen visuelles Bewusstsein benötigen. 
 
Schlagwörter: Visuelles Bewusstsein, interokulare Suppression, Gesichter, Körper, 
Blickrichtungen, emotionale Gesichtsausdrücke 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
1 General introduction 
 
“What consciousness does is to provide human beings with an extraordinarily effective tool 
for doing natural psychology” (Humphrey, 1987, p. 10). 
 
Humans are extraordinarily social animals. Living in groups is central to human existence. 
Groups provide resources that are vital to reproduction and survival, such as protection 
against predators, childrearing, mutually beneficial social exchange, and a pool of potential 
partners for mating. However, an environment populated by other agents also presents 
challenges to the social animal. Because all agents follow their own goals, their behavior is 
often hard to predict. To successfully navigate our social world, it is therefore necessary to 
read others’ mental and emotional states and to infer their intentions, that is, we need to do 
“natural psychology” (Humphrey, 1987). Nicholas Humphrey’s provocative proposal is that 
the need for social intelligence in a complex social world has exerted selection pressure, 
resulting in increased brain size (Dunbar, 1998) and culminating in the emergence of 
consciousness (Humphrey, 1987).  
 Although highly speculative, the idea that consciousness reflects neural mechanisms 
that evolved to deal with the unpredictability of social environments and the complexities of 
social interactions is not inconsistent with current accounts of the functions of consciousness. 
Most views converge on the notion that consciousness is central to flexibly adjust behavior to 
novel situations and complex environmental demands, to monitor and communicate one’s 
own internal state and to infer the mental state of other individuals (Baars & McGovern, 
1996; Cleeremans, 2005; Crick & Koch, 2003; Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007). For example, in 
Baars’ global workspace theory only conscious content is distributed to unconscious 
specialized expert systems which can then be combined to recruit all available cognitive 
resources in novel or unpredictable situations (Baars, 1988, 1997). Because at any given 
moment only one condensed set of events can have this privileged status of “fame in the 
brain” (Dennett, 2001) and be conscious, representations of external and internal stimuli and 
events compete for access to consciousness (Baars, 1997; James, 1890). To enable adaptive 
behavior, those representations that are particularly relevant to the organism’s goals and to 
interactions with the environment should have privileged access to consciousness (James, 
1890). 
Here we asked whether the unique biological and social significance of other 
individuals is reflected in privileged access to consciousness for those visual stimuli that are 
diagnostic for the presence of other persons, such as human faces and human bodies, and for 
facial features that are central to social interaction and communication, such as eye gaze and 
facial expressions. Conversely, we hypothesized that some elaborate processing of complex 
features of socially relevant visual stimuli might be possible without accessing the capacity-
limited stage of conscious awareness. We therefore tested whether specific facial features 
would be processed unconsciously.  
 While vision scientists had long focused almost exclusively on the coding of simple 
visual stimuli such as bars, gratings, moving dots or color patches, the discovery of face-
selective cells in macaque inferotemporal cortex (Gross, Rocha-Miranda, & Bender, 1972) 
has stimulated tremendous interest in the visual processing of complex social stimuli, with 
faces now being the most frequently used visual stimuli in experimental psychology 
(Nakayama, 2011). This research has demonstrated that the relevance of other persons is 
reflected at multiple levels in the human visual system, and can already be observed in 
neonates who show a preference for cues that are diagnostic for the presence of other 
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individuals, such as faces and face-like patterns (Farroni et al., 2005; Goren, Sarty, & Wu, 
1975; Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 1991; Valenza, Simion, Macchi Cassia, & 
Umità, 1996), eye contact (Farroni, Csibra, Simion, & Johnson, 2002), biological motion 
(Simion, Regolin, & Bulf, 2008), and goal-directed actions (Craighero, Leo, Umiltà, & 
Simion, 2011). Together with innate neural connectivity patterns, such inborn preferences 
may subsequently lead to specialization at higher levels of processing (Johnson, Grossmann, 
& Cohen Kadosh, 2009; McKone, Kanwisher, & Duchaine, 2007), finally resulting in expert 
recognition of face identity, body postures, and mental states. Indeed, neuroimaging studies 
have described distinct cortical areas in the ventral visual pathway specialized for processing 
faces (Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006) and human bodies (Peelen & Downing, 2007). 
It is clear from both everyday knowledge and a large body of literature that faces and 
bodies provide a wealth of information about another person’s identity, age, gender, actions, 
attractiveness, direction of attention, intentions, and emotional state (Slaughter, Stone, & 
Reed, 2004). Whether the social relevance of other persons is reflected in social visual 
information having privileged access to visual awareness, however, has rarely been examined. 
This may be due to the fact that visual processing that precedes and leads to visual awareness 
is, by definition, inaccessible to introspection. Nevertheless, the rapid and accurate detection1 
of other persons has presumably been highly beneficial for adaptive behavior in human 
evolution and is an essential first step in social cognition and interaction. 
 
1.1 Structure of the thesis 
The next part of this Introduction will briefly introduce the experimental technique we used to 
study access to awareness and unconscious processing. Section 2 contains a summary and 
discussion of our empirical studies. Due to the wide range of topics, the presentation of the 
results from the different studies in Section 2 is preceded by a short introduction into the 
respective topic and the relevant literature to clarify the motivation of our specific research 
question. Section 2 also highlights the links between our studies and discusses apparently 
inconsistent findings. Finally, Section 3 provides some general conclusions and suggests 
directions for future research. 
 
1.2 Interocular suppression 
Vision scientists have developed psychophysical techniques that open a window into the 
competitive dynamics of neural assemblies (Koch, 2004) underlying conscious perception 
(Kim & Blake, 2005). For example, when dissimilar images are presented to the two eyes at 
corresponding visual field locations, observers typically experience perceptual alternations 
between the two images rather than perceiving one composite percept. This phenomenon of 
binocular rivalry is believed to result from reciprocal inhibition between neural 
representations of the two stimuli at multiple levels of the visual system (Sterzer, 
Kleinschmidt, & Rees, 2009; Tong, Meng, & Blake, 2006). The neural population 
representing the perceptually dominant stimulus exerts stronger inhibition, thereby 
suppressing the other stimulus from awareness. As the dominant neural population adapts 
                                                
1  Please note that the terms “access to awareness” and “detection” are used 
interchangeably throughout this thesis (Rafal, Danziger, Grossi, Machado, & Ward, 2002), 
both referring to measures of localization performance. Likewise, the expression “awareness 
of” a stimulus, e.g. faces, here is meant to be a shortened form of “access to awareness for” 
and does not mean that participants discriminated or identified the stimulus or the stimulus 
category. 
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over time, inhibition weakens until a perceptual switch occurs and the other stimulus achieves 
dominance (Alais, 2012; Alais, Cass, O’Shea, & Blake, 2010; Levelt, 1965). Since Crick and 
Koch (1998) proposed rivalry as a powerful tool for tracing the neural concomitants of visual 
awareness, many human neuroimaging and monkey neurophysiology studies have 
characterized the neural correlates of perceptual dominance and suppression (Baker, 2010; 
Lin & He, 2009; Sterzer et al., 2009; Tong et al., 2006). For our present purpose of measuring 
access to awareness and unconscious processing, however, conventional binocular rivalry was 
not optimally suited, because perceptual switches occur unpredictably, possibly due to neural 
noise (Wilson, 2003).   
  We therefore used continuous flash suppression (CFS, Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005), a 
potent interocular suppression technique that allows for long and reliable periods of 
suppression. In CFS, the perception of a foveally presented stimulus such as a face 
photograph can be completely suppressed by a train of colorful, high-contrast patterns flashed 
at about 10 Hz to the other eye (see Figure 1A). This period of invisibility can last for a 
couple of seconds – or even minutes (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005) – until the stimulus finally 
overcomes suppression and gains access to awareness. Suppression during CFS is much 
deeper than during binocular rivalry (Tsuchiya, Koch, Gilroy, & Blake, 2006). Although it 
seems straightforward to attribute the effectiveness and depth of CFS to the fact that the 
continuously flashing masks prevent the corresponding neural representations from being 
adapted, it is not yet clear whether CFS should be regarded as a particularly effective variant 
of binocular rivalry (Shimaoka & Kaneko, 2011) or whether CFS involves distinct 
mechanisms (Tsuchiya et al., 2006). 
 In the present studies we employed CFS in two ways. In Studies 1–7 we recorded the 
duration of perceptual suppression during CFS as a measure of detection performance for 
different stimuli (see Figure 1A). In these studies, participants were asked to localize an 
initially invisible stimulus as quickly and accurately as possible (Jiang, Costello, & He, 2007). 
Recent studies have demonstrated that this detection paradigm is a powerful and sensitive 
device to probe potency of stimuli to gain access to visual awareness. For example, upright 
faces and words are suppressed for shorter durations than inverted (i.e., rotated by 180°) faces 
and words (Jiang et al., 2007; Yang & Yeh, 2011). Suppression durations have also been 
found to be modulated by emotional facial expressions (Sterzer, Hilgenfeldt, Freudenberg, 
Bermpohl, & Adli, 2011; Tsuchiya, Moradi, Felsen, Yamazaki, & Adolphs, 2009; Yang, Zald, 
& Blake, 2007), emotional words (Yang & Yeh, 2011), semantic priming (Costello, Jiang, 
Baartman, McGlennen, & He, 2009), natural scene content (Mudrik, Breska, Lamy, & 
Deouell, 2011), and by congruency with concurrently presented odors (Zhou, Jiang, He, & 
Chen, 2010b). One challenge to comparing detection performance among different stimulus 
conditions is that suppression durations are strongly influenced by physical stimulus 
“strength” (e.g., contrast, luminance, spatial frequency). Even when mean luminance, global 
contrast and spatial frequency content are equated across conditions, local physical stimulus 
differences can still affect suppression durations (Yang et al., 2007). The influence of such 
factors and how to control for them is therefore repeatedly addressed in Section 2. 
 In Studies 8 and 9 we took a different approach and tested whether facial features 
continue to be processed when rendered permanently invisible by CFS.  Whereas many recent 
studies found that basic stimulus features such as orientation, spatial frequency, color or 
translational motion can be processed despite suppression (Lin & He, 2009), it remains 
unclear to what extent more complex visual information such as faces or facial features can be 
represented without awareness under interocular suppression. There is only some limited 
evidence that specific stimulus attributes related to emotional or highly arousing stimuli 
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(Adams, Gray, Garner, & Graf, 2010; Jiang, Costello, Fang, Huang, & He, 2006; Yang et al., 
2011), manipulable objects (Almeida, Mahon, & Caramazza, 2010; Almeida, Mahon, 
Nakayama, & Caramazza, 2011), and numerical information (Bahrami et al., 2010) can 
escape suppression and remain behaviorally effective. 
 
 
Figure 1. (A) Schematic of the experimental protocol to measure suppression durations 
during CFS. To induce interocular suppression, high contrast CFS masks flashing at 10 Hz 
are presented to one eye, while a test stimulus, for example a face, is gradually introduced to 
the other eye. At the beginning of a trial, the test stimulus is invisible. Observers are asked to 
indicate as quickly and accurately as possible the location in which the test stimulus or any 
part of it becomes visible. (B) Schematic of the binocular control condition (see Section 2.4) 
in which the same stimuli as during CFS are presented binocularly and the test stimulus is 
presented transparently on top of the masks. Transparency is gradually reduced over the 
course of a trial. 
 
 
2 Summary and discussion of empirical studies 
In Studies 1–3 we measured the detection of visual information that is diagnostic for the 
presence of conspecifics – human faces and human bodies. In Studies 4–6 we investigated the 
influence of eye contact and emotion on visual awareness of faces. Study 7 represents a 
methodological excursion to critically evaluate whether perceptual suppression during CFS 
can be taken as a marker of unconscious processing during interocular suppression. Finally, in 
Studies 8 and 9 we probed adaptation aftereffects from face shape and eye gaze rendered 
permanently invisible by CFS. 
 
2.1 Visual awareness of faces: Functional mechanisms (Studies 1 and 2) 
Faces provide a rich source of social information. Before we can make full use of this 
information, however, we need to localize a face in the visual field. In the first two studies we 
investigated which facial properties determine whether we detect and thus consciously 
perceive another person’s face. Whereas countless studies have examined how we identify 
and remember individual faces, surprisingly little is known about the perceptual mechanisms 
that govern the simple detection of a face. The most influential models of face perception 
have focused exclusively on the cognitive and neural mechanisms that process faces only 
after they have been detected and categorized as faces (Bruce & Young, 1986; Burton, Bruce, 
& Hancock, 1999; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000; Valentine & Endo, 1992). By contrast, 
in machine vision it is natural to draw a distinction between an initial stage of face detection 
and a subsequent process of face recognition (Hjelmås & Low, 2001; Viola & Jones, 2004), 
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as detection and recognition have fundamentally different computational goals. Whereas face 
recognition depends on fine-grained facial information that distinguishes individual faces, 
detection mechanisms need to be sensitive to visual information that is common to all faces. 
Only recently, neuropsychological studies on individuals with acquired and developmental 
prosopagnosia have revealed a dissociation between face detection and face recognition 
abilities in the human visual system (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006). Prosopagnosic 
individuals show severe deficits in face recognition, but perform well in face detection tasks 
(de Gelder & Rouw, 2000; Garrido, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2008; Le Grand et al., 2006).  
As a consequence, some more recent account of face perception now incorporate a 
distinct initial stage of face detection in a hierarchy of face processing stages (de Gelder, 
Frissen, Barton, & Hadjikhani, 2003; Grill-Spector & Kanwisher, 2005; Johnson, 2005; Tsao 
& Livingstone, 2008). For example, the model by Tsao and Livingstone (2008) holds that 
certain visually responsive neurons early in the face processing hierarchy are specifically 
tuned to detect face-related information in the visual input and to segment faces from the 
background. These face detection mechanisms are assumed to act as domain-specific filters, 
passing visual information to downstream face-specific recognition mechanisms only when 
the input contains features indicative of a face. Accordingly, face detection is fundamental to 
all subsequent, more elaborate processing steps such as identification, social categorization or 
long-term memory encoding. 
How can such face detection mechanisms localize regions in the visual field that 
contain a face? Because all faces share the same global structure, face detection can 
efficiently be achieved by matching the visual input to an internal representation 
corresponding to the structure of a prototypical upright face (Lewis & Ellis, 2003; Tsao & 
Livingstone, 2008). This internal “face template” is assumed to represent the “first-order 
relations” between facial features that are invariant across different face exemplars (e.g., two 
eyes above nose above mouth; Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002; McKone et al., 2007; 
Tsao & Livingstone, 2008). Indeed, when these spatial relations among facial parts are 
distorted by turning faces upside down, face detection performance declines (Garrido et al., 
2008; Lewis & Edmonds, 2003; Purcell & Stewart, 1988; Tyler & Chen, 2006). As upright 
and inverted faces consist of physically identical features, this face inversion effect (FIE) 
supports the notion that face detection critically depends on information about the relative 
spatial arrangement of facial features. In other words, the goodness of fit between the visual 
input and the internal face template is supposed to determine access to conscious awareness. 
A poor fit could account for the decline in detection performance for inverted faces (Lewis & 
Ellis, 2003; Purcell & Stewart, 1988). 
The comparison of physically identical upright and inverted stimuli is an elegant way 
to examine the mechanisms that govern access to visual awareness, because the confounding 
influence of potential differences in low-level physical stimulus properties is ruled out. 
Moreover, following the idea that face detection involves matching the visual input to an 
upright (deformable) face template (Lewis & Edmonds, 2003; McKone et al., 2007; Tsao & 
Livingstone, 2008), the difference in detection performance for upright and inverted faces, i.e. 
the FIE, can be regarded as reflecting the goodness of fit of a given face stimulus to the 
internal template. Thus, we used the size of the FIE as a quantification of how well early 
perceptual mechanisms supporting visual awareness of faces are tuned to different face-
related visual input. 
To measure the effect of face inversion on simple detection, we used CFS to render 
upright or inverted faces invisible at the beginning of each trial and recorded the time 
participants needed to localize the initially invisible stimulus. Previous studies found that 
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upright faces overcome CFS and break into awareness considerably more quickly than 
inverted faces (Jiang et al., 2007; Zhou et al., 2010a). This CFS technique may therefore be 
particularly well suited to reveal visual information used to detect a face. We approached this 
question from two different angles. In the first study, we asked whether face detection 
mechanisms in adults share similarities with innate face preferences. In the second study, we 
took an opposite approach and tested whether visual experience with faces from one’s own 
social groups facilitates access to visual awareness.  
 
2.1.1 Similarities between face detection in adults and newborns’ looking preferences 
(Study 1) 
We examined whether face detection in adults relies on facial properties similar to those 
underlying newborns’ looking preference for faces and face-like stimuli (Goren et al., 1975; 
Johnson et al., 1991; Valenza et al., 1996). Importantly, neonates preferentially look at 
upright compared to inverted faces (Farroni et al., 2005). This has led to notion of an inborn 
face template representing the facial structure that drives the early development of face-
specific neural structures and might serve to detect faces throughout life (McKone et al., 
2007; Tomalski, Csibra, & Johnson, 2009a; Tomalski, Johnson, & Csibra, 2009b). We tested 
two central predictions from the hypothesis that the advantage of upright faces in gaining 
access to awareness during CFS reflects perceptual mechanisms similar to those critical to 
elicit newborns’ orienting biases towards upright faces (Stein, Peelen, & Sterzer, 2011b). 
First, newborns’ preference for upright over inverted faces is abolished when faces 
are contrast-reversed or lit from below (Farroni et al., 2005), indicating that the putative 
innate face template does not only represent first-order relations between facial features, but 
also ordinal contrast relationships characteristic for faces under natural viewing conditions. 
Similarly, our findings suggest that face detection in adults does not only rely on the 
extraction of first-order relations between facial features, but is also highly sensitive to 
contrast relations within the face. In three experiments, we found the size of the FIE to be 
reduced when these ordinal contrast relationships were distorted by contrast reversal or 
bottom-up lighting. 
Second, looking biases in newborns can be elicited even by simple head-shaped 
patterns containing only three dark blobs representing the upright configuration of the eyes 
and the mouth (Johnson et al., 1991; Morton & Johnson, 1991), and this effect is not seen for 
contrast-reversed patterns (Farroni et al., 2005). This suggests that coarse face-like visual 
information, possibly conveyed by a subcortical face detection pathway (Johnson, 2005), is 
sufficient to trigger newborns’ looking biases. In an additional experiment, we found that 
such simple head-shaped patterns were perceptually suppressed for longer periods when the 
arrangement of the blobs representing the eyes and the mouth was inverted, and this inversion 
effect was reduced for contrast-reversed face-like patterns.  
Interestingly, there was no difference in detection times for upright and inverted face-
like patterns in a binocular control experiment not involving interocular suppression (for an 
example, see Figure 1A). The increased sensitivity of the CFS technique to inversion may 
reflect CFS-specific unconscious processing differences between upright and inverted stimuli 
(Jiang et al., 2007; Zhou et al., 2010a; but see Section 2.4). Faces rendered invisible by 
interocular suppression have been found to activate subcortical structures such as the 
amygdala in the absence of corresponding ventral visual cortex activity (Jiang & He, 2006; 
Pasley, Mayes, & Schultz, 2004; Williams, Morris, McGlone, Abbott, & Mattingley, 2004). 
Thus, it could be speculated that the advantage of upright face-like patterns in gaining access 
to awareness involves a subcortical face detection pathway that is supposed to trigger 
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newborns’ orienting biases towards faces and that remains functional in the adult brain 
(Johnson, 2005).  
In summary, our results indicate a close similarity between the facial attributes that 
are central to visual awareness of faces in adults and the facial properties that attract 
newborns’ gaze.  
 
2.1.2 Own-race and own-age biases in face detection (Study 2) 
These findings suggest that the perceptual mechanisms underlying face detection are broadly 
tuned to register all visual information that could be indicative of an upright face under 
natural lighting conditions. Thus, it is possible that relatively hard-wired face detection 
mechanisms respond to all visual patterns that contain the first-order relations and the normal 
contrast relations of upright faces (Johnson, 2005; McKone et al., 2007; Tomalski et al., 
2009a). An alternative possibility is that the perceptual mechanisms mediating simple 
detection at the initial stage of face processing are modified by visual experience and more 
narrowly tuned to those faces that have been encountered most frequently. Indeed, the 
inversion effects obtained in the previous experiments were not of equal size across all 
conditions, but were larger for naturalistic face stimuli than for simple face-like patterns. 
Studies on face recognition have demonstrated that – despite the remarkable ability of 
human observers to discriminate and remember a myriad of individual faces – such face 
expertise does not equally encompass all kinds of faces. Perhaps most famously, people have 
difficulty recognizing faces of a race group other than their own (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). 
Similarly, observers are worse at recognizing faces of other ages compared to their own age 
group (Rhodes & Anastasi, 2011). These in-group advantages are assumed to reflect 
extensive visual experience with faces from one’s own social group that tunes face 
recognition mechanisms to the more familiar morphology of in-group faces (Rossion & 
Michel, 2011). As a consequence, in-group faces are processed in a less holistic, more 
piecemeal and hence less efficient way (de Heering & Rossion, 2008; Michel, Rossion, Han, 
Chung, & Caldara, 2006; Tanaka, Kiefer, & Bukach, 2004). We tested whether such 
processing advantages for in-group faces would manifest at the initial stage of face detection. 
 In two experiments, we had young Caucasian adults detect same-race and other-race 
faces as well as same-age and other-age faces under CFS (Stein, End, & Sterzer, submitted). 
Suppression durations revealed large differences in the size of the FIE depending on social 
category. For faces from the participants’ own race and age group the FIE was about twice as 
large as the FIE for faces from other race and age groups. Although we tested young 
Caucasian adults only, the comparison of identical upright and inverted faces within each face 
category rules out the possibility that this early perceptual bias for upright in-group faces was 
driven by low-level physical stimulus differences between face categories. Thus, these 
findings suggest that social categories modulate the initial stage of face processing, and 
thereby influence whether we see another person’s face in the first place. 
 The impact of social categories on face detection demonstrates that the human visual 
system does not work like many machine vision algorithms that detect faces by matching the 
input to a coarse face template. Rather, these own-race and own-age biases are consistent with 
the “experienced-based holistic account” by Rossion and Michel (2011) which holds that both 
memory as well as perceptual deficits for other-race (and potentially other-age) faces result 
from a poor match between the faces’ unfamiliar morphology and an experience-derived 
template representing the global structure of an average of all faces known to the observer. 
Nevertheless, this account is compatible with the idea that an innate face template may serve 
as the basis for the subsequent fine-tuning of face detection mechanisms according to the 
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specific social environment, and leaves open the possibility that traces of inborn face 
detection mechanisms may be preserved in the adult visual system. 
 
2.2 Visual awareness of conspecifics: Inversion effects for bodies (Study 3) 
Besides from these specific functional considerations, the strong effect of face inversion on 
the duration of perceptual suppression in itself demonstrates that the visual system is 
extremely sensitive to face-related visual information. In fact, it has been argued that 
inversion effects in simple detection are restricted to faces (Zhou et al., 2010a) and rely on the 
unconscious extraction of structural facial information in cortical areas that are specialized for 
face processing (Jiang et al., 2007; Zhou et al., 2010a), such as the fusiform face area 
(Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997). It is possible that such-face specific detection 
mechanisms operating outside of conscious awareness have evolved to rapidly detect the 
presence of other individuals in the visual field. In addition to another person’s face, however, 
another important stimulus that signals the presence of conspecifics is the human body.  
Indeed, there are a number of similarities between the visual processing of faces and 
bodies. First, both faces and bodies capture attention and are processed with higher priority 
than other objects (Downing, Bray, Rogers, & Childs, 2004; Langton, Law, Burton, & 
Schweinberger, 2008; Lavie, Ro, & Russell, 2003; Ro, Friggel, & Lavie, 2007). Second, 
human neuroimaging studies have not only identified face-selective cortical areas such as the 
FFA, but also distinct body-selective cortical regions, namely the adjacent and spatially 
overlapping fusiform body area (Peelen & Downing, 2005; Schwarzlose, Baker, & Kanwisher, 
2005) and the extrastriate body area (Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & Kanwisher, 2001). Finally, 
the recognition of faces and bodies, more strongly than the perception of other objects, relies 
on the extraction of configurations of features rather than individual features in isolation 
(Minnebusch & Daum, 2009). In recognition tasks, inversion does not only interfere with face 
discrimination (Yin, 1969; Robbins & McKone, 2007), but also with the discrimination of 
individual bodies (Reed, Stone, Bozova, & Tanaka, 2003; Reed, Stone, Grubb, McGoldrick, 
2006), albeit to a lesser degree (Minnebusch & Daum, 2009). It is has been unknown, 
however, whether inversion of bodies, like faces, influences perception at the initial detection 
stage. We hypothesized that if perceptual mechanisms specialized for the detection of persons 
in their normal upright orientation exist, inversion may affect the earliest levels of visual body 
processing in a similar way as it affects face detection.  
In a series of seven experiments we measured the effect of inversion on the duration 
of perceptual suppression during CFS for bodies, faces, and other familiar animate and 
inanimate object categories (Stein, Sterzer, & Peelen, 2012b). Upright bodies were detected 
considerably more quickly then inverted bodies, independent of whether they were presented 
as headless photographs or as silhouettes without facial information. This body inversion 
effect (BIE) persisted at full strength for silhouettes depicting highly variable and 
asymmetrical postures seen from various viewpoints. By contrast, no BIE was found when we 
randomly reattached body parts in their upright position to the trunk, indicating that the 
spatial relations of the body parts relative to the trunk are necessary to activate body detection 
mechanisms. Importantly, the BIE was larger than the effect of inversion on the detection of 
other familiar object categories (chairs, table lamps, home plants, trees). Furthermore, a 
general detection advantage for animate objects (New, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2007; Tipples, 
Young, Quinlan, Broks, & Ellis, 2002) is unlikely to account for this effect, as the BIE was 
also larger than inversion effects for chimpanzee faces, dogs and birds. Finally, in three 
experiments we directly compared the size of the BIE to the FIE for human faces and found 
no significant differences.  
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This pattern of results – similar BIE and FIE without comparable effects for other 
familiar objects – indicates that early stages of visual perception that mediate access to 
awareness are preferentially tuned to both upright human faces and human bodies, i.e. to cues 
that signal the presence of conspecifics (see Figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Inversion effects for human bodies and faces, other objects (animate and inanimate) 
obtained under CFS and during a binocular control condition not involving interocular 
suppression. For each subject and each stimulus condition, normalized effects were obtained 
by dividing the difference between mean response times for upright and inverted test stimuli 
by the mean response time for inverted stimuli (Tsuchiya et al., 2009). Points denote the 
respective inversion effect averaged across subjects. Thumbnails depict an example stimulus 
from each category. Numbers below the points refer to the numbers below the associated 
thumbnails. Please note that this overview includes data from a number of additional 
experiments that are not reported in the manuscript (Stein et al., 2012b), for example 
vertically and horizontally cut bodies, Mooney-like faces, cars, or bottles. 
 
 
2.3 Facial features modulate visual awareness of faces: Eye contact and emotion (Studies 
4–6) 
There are, however, some more specific visual cues displayed by conspecifics that can 
dynamically change according to the social context and may therefore be particularly 
important for social communication and adaptive behavior. Two such cues are facial 
expressions and eye gaze directions.  
 
2.3.1 Eye contact facilitates awareness of faces (Study 4) 
Eye gaze is central to social interactions, in that is provides information about another 
person’s emotional and cognitive state, goals, intentions and direction of attention (Allison, 
Puce, & McCarthy, 2000; Baron-Cohen, 1997; Itier & Batty, 2009; Nummenmaa & Calder, 
2008). The perception of direct and averted gaze is associated with partially distinct cognitive 
processes. While the perception of averted gaze is primarily associated with attentional shifts 
that can occur in a relatively reflexive manner (Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007), direct 
gaze signals that the observer is the current center of attention and interest (George & Conty, 
2008). In many non-human animals, direct gaze indicates threat and triggers defensive 
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responses (Emery, 2000). By contrast, in humans eye contact serves to initiate social 
communication and to establish joint attention.  
Converging lines of evidence suggest that this evolutionary and social relevance of 
direct gaze is reflected in the human visual system. Already in the first few days of life, 
infants prefer faces making eye contact over faces with averted gaze (Farroni et al., 2002). In 
adults, faces with direct gaze attract and hold spatial attention (von Grünau & Anston, 1995; 
Senju & Hasegawa, 2005; Senju, Hasegawa, & Tojo, 2005). This processing advantage for 
faces with direct gaze, referred to as the “eye contact effect” has been proposed to be 
mediated by a fast subcortical pathway involving the amygdala which then modulates cortical 
gaze-processing areas such as superior temporal sulcus (STS; Senju & Johnson, 2009). 
Because neuroimaging studies on face processing under interocular suppression revealed 
residual activity in both the amygdala (Jiang & He, 2006; Pasley et al., 2004; Williams et al., 
2004) and the STS (Jiang & He, 2006), we hypothesized that eye contact may be extracted 
under interocular suppression and modulate access to visual awareness for faces rendered 
initially invisible through CFS (Stein, Senju, Peelen, & Sterzer, 2011c). 
We used a set of face stimuli that controlled for the influence of eye symmetry in 
faces with direct gaze and straight head orientation. Face stimuli with averted and direct gaze 
were constructed from the same models with laterally averted heads. Eye regions containing 
eyes that were directed either maximally to the left or to the right were derived from other 
photographs of the same persons and then superimposed on the base images. This yielded the 
impression of direct gaze when eye gaze and head were oriented in opposite directions and 
the impression of averted gaze when eye gaze and head were pointing in the same direction. 
In a series of experiments, we measured the time participants needed to localize these face 
stimuli under CFS. Suppression durations were consistently shorter for faces making eye 
contact with the observer than for faces with averted gaze.  
Thus, faces with direct gaze have an advantage in gaining access to awareness, 
enabling the rapid detection of other individuals making eye contact with the observer. These 
findings are consistent with shorter suppression durations for other ecologically relevant 
facial information, such as fearful expressions (Tsuchiya et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2007). 
What is more, the effect of eye contact on access to visual awareness suggests that early 
visual processing occurring before conscious detection does not only prepare the organism for 
fight-or-flight responses to threat signals, but also for social contact and communication. 
 
2.3.2 A confound in schematic emotional faces (Study 5) 
Whereas the comparison of faces with direct and averted gaze allowed us to control for the 
potential influence of low-level physical stimulus properties, this is more difficult or even 
virtually impossible to achieve for naturalistic face stimuli with different facial expressions 
that necessarily differ along physical dimensions. For example, even when fearful and neutral 
face photographs are matched on global contrast and mean luminance, larger eye whites in 
fearful faces can cause better detection (Yang et al., 2007). Since Purcell, Stewart, and Skov 
(1996) showed that similar low-level differences between face photographs could account for 
the “anger superiority” effect, i.e. efficient visual search for an angry face in an array of 
happy faces (Hansen & Hansen, 1988), researchers studying the visual processing of 
emotional faces have been very cautious about such confounding physical stimulus 
differences. As a consequence, numerous studies have used schematic line-drawings of faces 
instead of face photographs (Frischen, Eastwood, & Smilek, 2008; Horstmann, 2007). 
Because schematic faces representing facial expressions differ only in the orientation of the 
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line-drawn “facial features” such as the mouth curve, they are believed to convey different 
emotional meanings in the absence of low-level physical stimulus differences. 
 Motivated by the overarching view that threatening or negatively charged facial 
expressions capture attention and receive prioritized processing (Öhman & Mineka, 2001; 
Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010; Vuilleumier & Driver, 2007), many studies compared visual 
search for negative (“smileys” with an inverted mouth curve)  and positive (“smileys”) 
schematic faces. However, despite extensive research using schematic emotional faces in 
visual search tasks, it is still debated whether positive or negative schematic faces are 
processed more efficiently (e.g., Horstmann, Scharlau, & Ansorge, 2006). One main reason 
for the difficulties in interpreting results from this line of research is that visual search 
performance is not only determined by the target stimulus, but strongly modulated by 
interactions between properties of the target and the distractors (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; 
Horstmann et al., 2006).  
To rule out the influence of target-distractor similarities we measured detection 
performance for single negative and positive schematic emotional faces during CFS (Stein & 
Sterzer, 2012). Briefly, positive schematic faces overcame CFS more quickly than negative 
schematic faces. However, further experiments demonstrated that this effect was not related 
to stimulus valence, but due to the pronounced congruency between the mouth curve and the 
face contour in positive schematic faces. While these findings demonstrate the sensitivity of 
CFS to subtle differences in stimulus configurations and help to reconcile a number of 
discrepancies in the visual search literature, the most important implication is that schematic 
faces cannot be considered as well-controlled visual stimuli that differ only in terms of 
emotional meaning. Instead, the unnaturally exaggerated congruency between the mouth 
curve and the face contour in positive schematic faces which contrasts with the unnatural 
incongruency in negative schematic faces has introduced a new confound that affects 
detection performance.  
As schematic faces additionally have limited ecological validity and because other 
recent studies revealed similar and additional stimulus confounds in schematic emotional 
faces (Becker, Anderson, Mortensen, Neufeld, & Neel, 2011; Coelho, Cloete, & Wallis, 2010; 
Horstmann, Becker, Bergmann, & Burghaus, 2010), future studies on the processing of 
emotional facial expressions could benefit from a return to naturalistic depictions of faces. It 
is possible that the influence of potential low-level confounds is not greater in well-controlled 
(e.g., contrast and luminance matched) photographs of emotional faces than in schematic 
depictions of emotional facial expressions. 
 
2.3.3 The role of spatial frequency in rapid fear detection (Study 6) 
In fact, these so-called “low-level” physical differences between facial expressions may 
actually represent the features that are key for discriminating between emotional facial 
expressions (Smith, Cottrell, Gosselin, & Schyns, 2005) and for eliciting perceptual biases 
such as rapid threat detection (Horstmann & Bauland, 2006). This would imply that a 
systematic manipulation of emotional faces along physical dimensions can reveal information 
used by the visual system to process such stimuli. Moreover, because different neurons are 
sensitive to distinct physical input, this approach can also be used to infer the neural pathways 
that process emotional faces.  
 The “standard hypothesis” (cf. Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010) of emotion processing in the 
human brain holds that the initial analysis of emotionally significant visual stimuli, and of 
stimuli signaling threat in particular, involves an extrageniculate subcortical pathway that 
projects from the retina to the amygdala via the superior colliculus and the pulvinar, 
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bypassing visual cortex (Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010). This subcortical “low road” (LeDoux, 
1996) is assumed to enable the rapid processing of threatening stimuli such as fearful facial 
expressions. For example, the advantage of fearful compared to neutral faces in overcoming 
CFS has been attributed to the low road (Yang et al., 2007). However, although the idea of a 
subcortical pathway to the amygdala is now common textbook knowledge (Gazzaniga, Ivry, 
& Mangun, 2008), there is no anatomical evidence for a connection conveying visual 
information from the superior colliculus or the pulvinar to the amygdala in the primate brain 
(Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010). 
 Nevertheless, it is possible to test the functional role of the putative subcortical route 
psychophysically by manipulating the spatial frequency content of visual stimuli supposed to 
be processed along this pathway. Because visually responsive neurons in the superior 
colliculus receive afferents mainly from magnocellular ganglion cells conveying low spatial 
frequency (LSF) information, the low road is assumed to convey mainly coarse LSF 
information to the amygdala, whereas the processing of detailed high-spatial frequency (HSF) 
information involves cortical visual areas (Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010; Vuilleumier, Armony, 
Driver, & Dolan, 2003). To examine the functional role of this putative low road in the human 
visual system, we therefore measured detection performance for low- and high-pass filtered 
fearful and neutral faces (Stein, Seymour, Hebart, & Sterzer, in preparation).  
Contrary to the purported role of an LSF-selective low road, across nine experiments 
we found the fear advantage to be specific to HSF information. First, the advantage of fearful 
relative to neutral faces in breakthrough from CFS was larger for HSF faces than for LSF 
faces. This HSF-specificity was independent of the spatial frequency of the masks and could 
not be explained by local contrast differences in the eye or mouth regions. Second, when we 
combined HSF and LSF information in hybrid faces, suppression durations were shorter for 
hybrids constructed from a HSF fearful face and an LSF neutral face than for hybrids 
containing an LSF fearful face and a HSF neutral face, even when the contrast of the HSF 
content was much lower than the contrast of the LSF content. Third, we replicated these 
findings from CFS using a sandwich masking paradigm.  
These results suggest that there is no functional role of an LSF-sensitive subcortical 
pathway in mediating the fear advantage. Instead, the rapid detection of fearful faces relies on 
detailed HSF information processed by cortical circuits. This is consistent with research on 
expression recognition, showing that the discrimination of fearful facial expressions from 
other emotions relies virtually entirely on HSF information (Adolphs, Gosselin, Buchanan, 
Tranel, Schyns, & Damasio, 2005; Smith & Schyns, 2009). Moreover, recent findings from a 
patient with bilateral amygdala damage who nevertheless showed a significant fearful-face 
advantage suggest that the amygdala is not necessary for rapid fear detection (Tsuchiya et al., 
2009). Together with our present findings in healthy observers, these results cast doubt on the 
existence of a subcortical pathway to the amygdala mediating rapid threat detection in the 
human visual system. 
 
2.4 Detection during interocular suppression: A direct measure of unconscious 
processing? (Study 7) 
All studies described so far used the duration of perceptual suppression induced by CFS to 
investigate the perceptual mechanisms that govern stimulus detection. However, when this 
method was first introduced, it was not supposed to index general detection performance, but 
to serve as a marker of unconscious processing under interocular suppression (Jiang et al., 
2007). In this view, differences in suppression durations, for example for upright and inverted 
faces, reflect differential unconscious processing under interocular suppression, i.e. CFS-
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specific unconscious processing differences. CFS-specific unconscious processing means that 
unconscious processing is present because CFS is applied to selectively interrupt conscious 
processing while leaving some unconscious processing intact. However, shorter suppression 
durations, for example for upright faces compared to inverted faces, could also be caused by 
generally lower thresholds for conscious detection independent of CFS-specific unconscious 
processing. 
 To rule out this possibility, a rapidly growing number of studies measuring detection 
during CFS have included a binocular control condition not involving interocular suppression. 
This control condition is supposed to mimic the perceptual experience under CFS and to 
measure potential threshold differences that are not specific to CFS (see Figure 1B; e.g., 
Costello et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2007; Mudrik et al., 2011; Stein et al., 2011a, 2011b; Yang 
& Yeh, 2010; Zhou et al., 2010a). The absence of detection differences in this control 
condition is taken to imply that an effect obtained with CFS is caused by CFS-specific 
unconscious processing. Thus, whether differences in suppression durations are interpreted as 
reflecting differential unconscious processing under CFS depends on the outcome of the 
binocular control condition. Importantly, this conclusion rests on the premise that the 
comparison between the CFS and the control condition does indeed isolate CFS-specific 
unconscious processing and does not reflect any other factors that might differ between 
conditions. Whether this premise is valid, however, has not been previously tested. This 
question is important because recent studies showing that suppression durations can be 
modulated by semantic content in natural scenes (Mudrik et al., 2011) and even by 
concurrently presented odors (Zhou et al., 2010b) challenge current views on the scope and 
limits of processing without awareness (Lin & He, 2009).  
In a series of six experiments, we made a first attempt to evaluate the validity of this 
novel approach to study unconscious processing during interocular suppression, using the 
effect of face inversion as an example (Stein, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2011a). Replicating previous 
reports, suppression durations were shorter for upright than for inverted faces. In addition, we 
obtained an FIE during CFS using non-speeded accuracy measures, thus ruling out that the 
upright face advantage was caused by differential response criteria for upright and inverted 
faces. Results also provided some evidence for an FIE in the binocular control condition, 
although in most experiments this effect was smaller than during CFS.  
Most importantly, our study revealed marked differences between the CFS and the 
control condition that may render the comparison between the two conditions to infer CFS-
specific unconscious processing invalid. First, we found large differences between the 
response time (RT) distributions from the two conditions, with much greater RT variability 
and a larger proportion of trials with very long RTs in the CFS condition. The distinct 
characteristics of the CFS and the control distributions may point to differences in the 
perceptual and cognitive engaged by face detection in the two conditions (Heathcote, Popiel, 
& Mewhort, 1991; Hockley, 1984; Ratcliff, 1979), perhaps resulting from the reduced 
predictability of stimulus appearance and greater temporal uncertainty in the CFS condition. 
Interestingly, in one experiment in which RT distributions were approximately matched, the 
size of the FIE did not differ between the two conditions. Second, trial-wise ratings of 
subjective face appearance showed that three different variants of binocular control conditions 
failed to resemble the perceptual experience under CFS.  
These findings demonstrate that CFS and the binocular control condition differ on 
various dimensions other than CFS-specific unconscious processing, and thus call into 
question the notion that the comparison of these two conditions can provide unequivocal 
evidence for CFS-specific unconscious processing. Nevertheless, on a positive note, the 
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increased size of the effects obtained with CFS demonstrates that this method can be 
effectively used to measure potency of visual stimuli to gain access to awareness. In fact, such 
detection measures, independent of the specific experimental paradigm, are sometimes 
regarded as reflecting unconscious processing, because faster detection can only happen when 
the visual system discriminates stimuli before detection, i.e., unconsciously (Dijksterhuis & 
Aarts, 2003; Gaillard, Del Cul, Naccache, Vinckier, Cohen, & Dehaene, 2006).  
 
2.5 Adaptation to facial features: The role of visual awareness (Studies 8 and 9) 
To investigate unconscious processing specific to interocular suppression, however, other 
methods than visual detection during CFS are required. In the final two studies, we therefore 
adopted the well-established dissociation logic (Erdelyi, 1986) to examine whether invisible 
facial features – face shape and eye gaze directions – can be represented under CFS. In the 
dissociation paradigm, a direct measure of conscious awareness of a stimulus feature (e.g., 
detection, discrimination) is compared to an indirect measure of unconscious processing of 
the same feature (e.g., priming, attentional cueing effects). Unconscious processing is inferred 
when no perceptual sensitivity is found in the direct measure, but some sensitivity in the 
indirect measure.   
 Probing visual adaptation to stimuli suppressed from visual awareness provides one 
powerful means to trace the extent and limits of visual coding without awareness (Blake & He, 
2005). Adaptation to basic visual features such as orientation, spatial frequency, motion, or 
color gives rise to visual aftereffects, referred to as the “psychologist’s microelectrode” 
(Frisby & Stone, 2010), as such aftereffects are assumed to reflect the activity of neural 
populations responsive to the particular visual feature. Accumulating evidence demonstrates 
that adaptation to more complex stimuli, such as faces, can also result in highly specific 
aftereffects (Clifford & Rhodes, 2005). When presented under interocular suppression, basic 
visual features that are known to be processed in early visual cortical areas can induce 
aftereffects without visual awareness (Lin & He, 2009), whereas high-level aftereffects from 
visual adaptation to facial identity, age, and gender are eliminated when the adapting stimulus 
is rendered invisible by interocular suppression (Amihai, Deouell, & Bentin, 2011; Moradi, 
Koch, & Shimojo, 2005; Shin, Stolte, & Chong, 2009).  
However, the absence of aftereffects from these specific facial attributes does not 
necessarily imply that all more complex visual representations related to facial information 
depend on visual awareness. Current multilevel accounts of interocular suppression (Sterzer 
et al., 2009; Tong et al., 2006) posit a gradual increase in the depth of suppression from early 
levels of the visual system that encode simple visual features to higher levels of visual 
processing that represent more complex and abstract stimulus properties (Nguyen, Freeman, 
& Alais, 2003; Sheinberg & Logothetis, 1997). Thus, it is possible that only high-level 
aftereffects that involve neural circuits located in anterior portions of the ventral visual 
pathway depend entirely on visual awareness, whereas more basic facial properties may be 
represented unconsciously. To test this hypothesis, in the first study we examined whether 
face shape aftereffects (Webster & MacLin, 1999) that rely on mid-level shape coding 
mechanisms (Jeffery, Rhodes, & Busey, 2006; Rhodes, Evangelista, & Jeffery, 2009) could 
be induced by adapting stimuli rendered invisible by CFS (Stein & Sterzer, 2011).  
 The second study (Stein, Peelen, & Sterzer, 2012a), in which we measured eye gaze 
adaptation during CFS, was motivated by the dual pathway model of face perception by 
Haxby and colleagues. In this model, changeable facial features (eye gaze, expression) are 
processed by the STS, while invariant facial features (identity) are processed by the lateral 
fusiform gyrus (Haxby et al., 2000). Interestingly, adaptation to suppressed emotional facial 
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expressions can result in significant aftereffects (Adams et al., 2010; but see Yang et al., 
2010) and the STS responds more strongly to invisible fearful than to neutral faces, while no 
such effect is seen in fusiform gyrus activity (Jiang & He, 2006). Because both facial 
expression and eye gaze are processed by the STS (Calder et al., 2007; Haxby et al., 2000; 
Puce, Allison, Bentin, Gore, & McCarthy, 1998), we hypothesized that eye gaze directions 
could be capable of inducing aftereffects without awareness. 
 
2.5.1 Face shape adaptation (Study 8) 
Face shape adaptation aftereffects refer to the phenomenon that prolonged exposure to a 
distorted (contracted, expanded) adapting face makes a subsequently presented test face 
appear distorted in the opposite direction (Webster & MacLin, 1999) and is assumed to result 
from neural populations coding general face shape in a view-dependent fashion (Jeffery et al., 
2006). The presentation of adapting faces under CFS yielded trials in which the adapting 
stimulus remained subjectively invisible and others in which the adapting face overcame 
suppression and became at least partially visible, presumably due to stochastic variations in 
the depth of interocular suppression (e.g., Blake & Logothetis, 2002). This allowed us to 
compare adaptation to invisible vs. partially visible face shape under constant physical 
stimulation. Control experiments ensured that participants could not discriminate the face 
shape of subjectively invisible adapting stimuli.  
 Across four experiments, we found that visual awareness of the adapting face resulted 
in larger face shape aftereffects (Stein & Sterzer, 2011). Invisible adapting faces induced 
aftereffects only when the adapting and the test face were presented to the same eye and in the 
same size. When the contribution of low-level, purely monocular mechanisms was ruled out 
by swapping the eye of stimulus presentation between the adapting and the test face, 
aftereffects were found only for subjectively visible adapting faces. Similarly, when the 
adapting and the test face were presented to the same eye but in different sizes, only partially 
visible adapting faces induced aftereffects. These results suggest that the representation of 
face shape requires awareness and that interocular competition as measured with CFS is 
resolved before the neural sites underlying mid-level visual representations of general face 
shape. 
 
2.5.2 Eye gaze adaptation (Study 9) 
In this final study, we adopted a similar design to test whether eye gaze aftereffects would be 
elicited by adaptation to invisible gaze directions (Stein et al., 2012a). Eye gaze aftereffects 
refer to observers’ increased tendency to categorize a test face with averted gaze as looking 
straight ahead after adaptation to averted gaze in the same direction (Calder, Jenkins, Cassel, 
& Clifford, 2008; Jenkins, Beaver, & Calder, 2006). This effect is related to the adaptation of 
neural populations in the anterior STS that code left and right gaze directions, respectively 
(Calder et al., 2007).  
 In four experiments, we again found larger aftereffects when the adapting stimulus 
became at least partially visible. More importantly, when the adapting and the test stimulus 
were presented in identical sizes, we obtained aftereffects from subjectively invisible adapting 
stimuli. In contrast to face shape aftereffects from invisible adapting faces (Stein & Sterzer, 
2011), these aftereffects from invisible eye gaze survived interocular transfer, suggesting that 
information about invisible gaze directions can be represented at levels of the visual system 
beyond purely monocular channels. However, introducing a size change between the adapting 
and the test stimulus eliminated aftereffects from invisible eye gaze. This indicates that size-
dependent low-level properties of eye gaze directions can be processed unconsciously, 
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whereas size-invariant higher-level representations of eye gaze directions depend on visual 
awareness. 
These results seem to be at odds with our previous study in which we found shorter 
suppression durations for faces with direct than with averted gaze (Stein et al., 2011c). One 
possibility is that this eye contact effect during CFS reflects a coarse signal associated with 
the arousal value of eye contact (Emery, 2000). Alternatively, the discrepancy between our 
two studies on eye gaze processing during CFS may be associated with the difference 
between a measure of visual detection of initially invisible stimuli and a measure of 
unconscious processing of stimuli rendered permanently invisible, as discussed in Section 2.4 
(Stein et al., 2011a).  
 
 
3 Conclusions and future directions 
The nine studies that constitute this thesis suggest that (a) visual stimuli that are diagnostic for 
other individuals, i.e. upright human faces and bodies, have privileged access to awareness, 
(b) face detection follows newborns looking preferences but is also strongly modulated by 
visual experience with one’s own social group, (c) eye contact results in faster face detection, 
(d) schematic emotional faces do not eliminate so-called low-level confounds, (e) rapid fear 
detection relies on high spatial frequencies, arguing against a functional role of a subcortical 
pathway to the amygdala, (f) visual detection during CFS cannot provide unequivocal 
evidence for unconscious processing specific to interocular suppression, and (g) only simple 
visual features can be represented when rendered permanently invisible by CFS, whereas 
high-level representations of face shape and eye gaze directions depend on visual awareness.  
Because we discussed the findings of our studies alongside with the summary of the 
results in Section 2, this final part outlines only a few particularly important results within a 
broader context, points out limitations, and highlights how our findings may stimulate future 
research. 
 
3.1 Face detection: Hard-wired or experience-derived? 
Study 1 showed that face detection in adult observers relies on facial features similar to those 
governing newborns’ looking preferences for faces (Stein et al., 2011b). Consistent with 
neonates’ preference for upright over inverted faces (Farroni et al., 2005), upright faces 
rendered initially invisible by CFS were detected more quickly than inverted faces, replicating 
previous findings (Jiang et al., 2007). More importantly, this face inversion effect (FIE) was 
larger for faces that had normal contrast and were illuminated from above than for faces that 
were contrast reversed and illuminated from below. Moreover, schematic patterns consisting 
of three dark blobs were detected more quickly when the arrangement of these blobs 
respected the face-like configuration of the eyes and the mouth, and this effect was modulated 
by contrast polarity. These results are consistent with the notion of an inborn face template 
that is coarsely tuned to detect the configuration and contrast relationships of the eyes and the 
mouth in upright faces under natural lighting conditions (Johnson, 2005; McKone et al., 2007; 
Tomalski et al., 2009a).  
This mechanisms, however, cannot account for the results from Study 2 in which the 
FIE was larger for faces from the observers’ own race and age group than for faces from other 
race and age groups (Stein, End, & Sterzer, submitted). Whereas such own-race and own-age 
biases are well-known to influence face recognition (Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Rhodes & 
Anastasi, 2011), these findings provide the first evidence that social categories modulate the 
initial detection of a face. In principle, this modulatory influence of visual experience on face 
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detection can also be explained by template matching. However, this internal face 
representation would have to be finely tuned to the faces from one’s own social categories. 
For example, to account for in-group advantages in face perception, Rossion and Michel 
(2011) proposed an experience-derived, holistic template face template representing an 
average of all known faces.  
How can we reconcile the apparently discrepant results from Study 1, supporting the 
idea of a coarsely tuned inborn face template, and Study 2, suggesting that face detection 
involves a finely tuned experience-derived face template? Two specific data points from 
Study 1 may provide a hint. First, the FIE tended to be smaller for face-like patterns than for 
face photographs. Second, although newborns show no preference for upright vs. inverted 
face-like patterns with reversed contrast polarity (Farroni et al., 2005), we found a small, 
albeit statistically significant, inversion effect even for contrast-reversed face-like patterns. 
Thus, the more parsimonious explanation of our data is that visual awareness of faces relies 
on an experience-derived template. This detection mechanisms could be finely tuned to the 
structure and morphology of faces from one’s own social groups – perhaps to an average face 
– but still provide a better fit to simple head-shaped patterns with an upright face-like blob 
configuration than to inverted blob configurations. Similarly, the reduced influence of 
inversion on the detection of faces under unnatural lighting conditions is consistent with an 
experience-shaped face detection mechanism.  
This interpretation would imply that the perceptual mechanisms supporting visual 
awareness of faces are not hard-wired but adapted to our visual and social environment. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that although the idea of template matching in the case of 
structurally consistent visual patterns such as faces is appealing (Brunelli & Poggio, 1993; 
Lewis & Edmonds, 2003; Yuille, 1991), quite different mechanisms of face perception are 
conceivable (Dakin & Watt, 2009; Viola & Jones, 2004). Furthermore, a potential problem 
with template matching is that a single template may be not sufficiently flexible to detect 
faces from different viewing angles. As studies on human face detection have not yet 
investigated the detection of side views of faces (except for slightly angled faces, e.g. Figure 
2), this is one possible avenue for future research.  
 
3.2 Both upright faces and bodies have privileged access to awareness 
In Study 3 we tested whether the mechanisms that govern access to awareness are specifically 
tuned only to upright faces (Zhou et al., 2010a), to all familiar object categories, or to visual 
information that is diagnostic for the presence of conspecifics, i.e. human faces and bodies 
(Stein et al., 2012b). Due to the strong impact of physical stimulus properties on suppression 
durations, it is virtually impossible to directly compare detection performance for stimuli 
from different object categories. We therefore again adopted the inversion paradigm, 
assuming that the comparison of suppression durations for identical stimuli in upright and 
inverted orientations can reveal detection mechanisms preferentially tuned to stimuli in their 
normal upright orientation. Our data showed large inversion effects for both human faces and 
bodies, suggesting that both upright human faces and upright human bodies have privileged 
access to awareness, whereas all other object categories, including chimpanzee faces and 
animals, yielded no or much smaller inversion effects (Figure 2).  
 It is interesting to relate these results to studies on face and body discrimination. Most 
experiments on discrimination (often used interchangeably with “recognition”) use a 
sequential matching task in which participants indicate whether a stimulus exemplar is the 
same as or different from the previously presented stimulus exemplar. The disproportionate 
size of the FIE obtained in such tasks is one of the main sources of evidence for face 
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perception being “special” (McKone et al., 2007). Indeed, the FIE is more correlated in 
monozygotic than dizygotic twins, indicating that the inversion paradigm in face 
discrimination taps into heritable aspects of face processing (Zhu et al., 2010; also see Wilmer 
et al., 2010). Certainly, whether individual differences in conscious awareness of other 
persons also have a genetic basis – identical or different from the genetic basis of face 
recognition – is a fascinating question for future research.  
In fact, Study 3 showed that the effect of inversion on detection differs in two 
important ways from the effect of inversion on discrimination. First, whereas the 
discrimination of individual faces is typically more strongly affected by inversion than the 
discrimination of body postures (Minnebusch & Daum, 2009), in our detection experiments 
the FIE and the body inversion effect (BIE) were of virtually equal size (see Figure 2). 
Second, while we found comparable effects of inversion for headless bodies and bodies with 
head contours only, the BIE in body posture discrimination tasks is critically dependent on 
head presence (Brandman & Yovel, 2010; Minnebusch, Suchan, & Daum, 2009; Yovel, Pelc, 
& Lubetzky, 2010). One possible reason for these differences is that faces are more important 
in discriminating other individuals than bodies, whereas faces and bodies may be similarly 
diagnostic for the presence of other persons (Bindemann, Scheepers, Ferguson, & Burton, 
2010). 
Finally, an important challenge for future research – also with regard to the distinct 
face detection mechanisms suggested by Studies 1 and 2 – will be to delineate the specific 
role of perceptual learning in the detection of conspecifics. Although the own-race and own-
age biases observed in Study 2 demonstrate that visual experience fine-tunes detection 
mechanisms, a more specific account might posit that the privileged detection of upright faces 
and bodies results from expertise in discriminating individual faces and bodies (Gauthier & 
Tarr, 2002). Significant experience or training in individuating exemplars of an object 
category has been found to increase inversion effects in discrimination tasks (Diamond & 
Carey, 1986; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997), although even after decades of experience these effects 
continue to be smaller than the effect of inversion on the discrimination of faces (McKone et 
al., 2007; Robbins & McKone, 2007). Nevertheless, whether expertise in individuating 
objects can affect visual awareness of these stimuli is unknown and hence remains an exciting 
issue open to further investigation.  
 
3.3 A subcortical pathway to the amygdala? 
In designing some of our studies (Study 1, Stein et al., 2011b, and Study 4, Stein et al., 2011c), 
we adopted the “standard hypothesis” (cf. Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010) of a subcortical pathway 
from the the superior colliculus through the pulvinar to the amygdala (Johnson, 2005; Öhman, 
2005; Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010) that processes emotionally and socially significant stimuli 
in a rapid, coarse, automatic and unconscious fashion. Indeed, the faster detection of faces 
with direct gaze than with averted gaze (Study 4) is consistent both with the purported 
function of this subcortical “low road” (LeDoux, 1996), i.e. to rapidly detect ecologically 
relevant visual information, as well as with current models of the processing of eye contact in 
the human brain (Senju & Johnson, 2009). Although it is interesting that a communicative 
signal such as eye contact influences visual awareness in the absence of low-level physical 
stimulus differences that are commonly associated with facial expressions, this effect of eye 
contact could also be mediated by enhanced processing along the geniculostriate pathway. 
 In Study 6 we directly addressed the functional role of a putative subcortical pathway 
to the amygdala (Stein, Seymour, Hebart, & Sterzer, in preparation). We tested the advantage 
of fearful over neutral faces in overcoming CFS, an effect that has been attributed to 
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processing along the low road (Yang et al., 2007). The subcortical pathway is assumed to 
receive mainly low spatial frequency (LSF) information, whereas high spatial frequency 
(HSF) image content is transmitted mainly by the geniculostriate pathway (Vuilleumier et al, 
2003). However, in Study 6 we found the fear advantage to be specific to HSF information. 
These results are the exact opposite of what would be expected if the fear advantage was 
mediated by a LSF-sensitive subcortical pathway. Because Study 6 was designed to be 
consistent with the study by Yang et al. (2007), future studies are necessary to test whether 
similar results will be obtained with other measures such as attentional orienting (Tomalski et 
al., 2009b), with larger stimuli further in the periphery, or with other stimulus categories such 
as snakes (Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001).  
 Nevertheless, our findings are consistent with accumulating evidence that now 
challenges the dominant standard hypothesis of a “fear module” (Öhman & Mineka, 2001; 
Öhman, 2005) implemented in a direct subcortical pathway to the amygdala. As recently 
outlined by Pessoa and Adolphs (2010), there is neither direct anatomical nor other clear 
evidence for a connection conveying visual information from the pulvinar to the amygdala. 
Moreover, they point out that all findings widely cited as support for the standard hypothesis, 
such as rapid, unconscious fear processing, affective blindsight (de Gelder, Vroomen, 
Pourtois, & Weiskrantz, 1999) or amygdala activity without primary visual cortex (Morris et 
al., 2001; Pegna, Khateb, Lazeyras, & Seghier, 2004) are either consistent with enhanced 
processing along the geniculostriate and ventral visual pathways, or could involve 
anatomically established projections from the lateral geniculate nucleus or the pulvinar to 
visual cortical areas beyond primary visual cortex. 
 While these considerations call for a revised model of rapid threat processing, a 
puzzling finding is that one neuroimaging study found stronger amygdala activity to fearful 
than to neutral faces only for LSF faces but not for HSF faces (Vuilleumier et al., 2003). 
However, recent data from a patient with complete bilateral amygdala damage who showed a 
normal detection advantage for fearful faces (Tsuchiya et al., 2009) suggest that not only the 
notion of a low road to the amygdala but also the role of the amygdala role in the initial 
detection of fear needs to be revised.     
 
3.4 How to interpret detection during interocular suppression? 
In Study 7, we asked whether a measure of detection performance can reveal evidence for 
unconscious processing under CFS (Stein et al., 2011a). In some of our previous studies 
measuring suppression durations we included binocular control conditions, explicitly (Study 
4) or rather implicitly (Studies 1, 3, and 5) following the prevailing view that a larger effect 
on detection performance in the CFS condition than in a binocular control condition not 
involving interocular suppression results from unconscious processing specific to CFS (e.g., 
Jiang et al., 2007; Mudrik et al., 2011). For this reasoning to be valid, the control condition 
needs to reflect all factors other than CFS-specific unconscious processing that influence 
detection performance in the CFS condition. In Study 7, we found marked differences 
between the two conditions that were not related to CFS-specific unconscious processing, but 
rather indicated that the control condition does neither match the perceptual experience during 
CFS nor the perceptual and cognitive processes engaged by detection during CFS. 
Furthermore, none of the published studies using this approach reported an effect in the 
control condition, suggesting that the gradual fade-in of a stimulus on top of the CFS masks 
(see Figure 1B) yields floor effects. We conclude that the comparison of detection during CFS 
to a binocular control condition cannot provide unequivocal evidence for CFS-specific 
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unconscious processing. Thus, the interpretation of effects obtained in previous studies needs 
to be reconsidered.  
 Nevertheless, the striking effects obtained with this method (see Section 1.2) call for 
an explanation, considering CFS-specific unconscious processing as only one possible 
mechanism. At present we and other researchers studying interocular suppression are faced 
with a “mystery” (R. Blake, personal communication, May 27, 2011) and can only speculate 
about the reason for the sensitivity of this method. We had hypothesized that the reduced 
predictability of stimulus appearance during CFS, perhaps being caused by stochastic 
processes similar to binocular rivalry (Blake & Logothetis, 2002), would lead to uncertainty 
and  shifts in response criteria that could have affected suppression durations as measured by 
a speeded detection task. However, at least the difference in suppression durations between 
upright and inverted faces appears not to be caused by criterion effects, as we found a similar 
advantage for upright faces in accuracy-based unspeeded detection tasks with fixed 
presentation durations (Stein et al., 2011a).  
Although this sensitivity to complex stimulus properties may point to the influence of 
CFS-specific unconscious processing, such high-level unconscious processing would be 
difficult to reconcile with studies adopting the dissociation paradigm. For example, 
suppression durations in Studies 1–7 were modulated by stimulus inversion, eye contact or 
category membership, whereas Studies 8 and 9 revealed the complete absence of visual 
adaptation to face shape (Study 8) and eye gaze directions (Study 9) rendered permanently 
invisible by CFS. Such discrepancies between methods, the uncertainties in reconciling 
results from different paradigms, and the ambiguous mapping of behavioral measures to 
unconscious and conscious processes underscores the need for clear, widely accepted and 
applied concepts, definitions, operationalizations and measures of unconscious and conscious 
processing. 
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